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 I n March 2012 the then Commissioner of the European Union (EU) for Enterprise and Industry Antonio Tajani announced 
“regulatory holidays” for the European industrial sector to ease 
the negative impacts caused by the financial and economic cri-
sis (Reuters 2012). Two years later, a report of the World Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF) even noticed an extensive rollback of 
environmental regulation as a result of the austerity measures 
promoted by the European Commission, the International 
Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank (WWF 2014).
These two incidences suggest a clear impact of economic 
trends on political enthusiasm in environmental policy-making. 
Unfortunately, we lack consistent scientific knowledge about 
this relationship. First and foremost, this is due to divergent 
and often inadequate conceptualizations of the central matter 
of interest – governmental activities in environmental policy 
and their changes over time.
In order to circumvent these shortcomings, we propose a 
measurement concept that adopts an aggregate view on the 
development of environmental policy and allows for system-
atic cross-sectional and longitudinal comparison. In a second 
step, we apply our concept to EU environmental policy-making 
in the subfields of clean air and water protection for the years 
1975 to 2014 and contrast the observed patterns with macro eco-
nomic data. Finally, we undertake a first attempt at theorizing 
the examined relationship through exploring different explan-
atory approaches.
The EU has become a major driver of environmental pol-
icy within and beyond its borders. Nonetheless, considering 
the strong economic rationale the Union builds upon, EU pol-
icy-makers have to carefully weigh up economic and environ-
mental concerns. This feature is reinforced by the strong em-
phasis of the concept of sustainable development that has been 
adopted as a general approach for assessing economic, social, 
and ecological impacts of any policy initiative at the EU level. 
To ensure that economic, social and environmental policies are 
indeed mutually reinforcing has to be seen in the context of the 
commitment to better regulation and, where necessary, deregu-
lation rather than simply more and more new regulation. ‘Bet-
ter regulation’ is a centerpiece of the renewed Lisbon Strategy. 
To make sure that regulation is used only when necessary and 
that the burdens they impose are proportionate to their aim, the 
European Commission has a number of processes and tools 
in place, including the withdrawal or modification of pending 
legislative proposals, the reduction in administrative burdens, 
measures to simplify existing legislation as well as the system-
atic use of impact assessment and public consultation in the 
development of new policy proposals (European Commission 
2006). Overall, this makes the EU an optimal subject matter to 
examine the relationship between economic measures and en-
vironmental policy-making.
Assessing policy change through  
 aggregation
There is a broad consensus among scholars that a policy is 
not a single entity but consists of various components (Hall 
1993; Howlett/Cashore 2009). Accordingly, our measurement 
approach incorporates the distinction between different policy 
components. We argue that governmental activities are best 
addressed by the assessment of three distinct dimensions: pol-
icy items, policy instruments and regulatory levels and scopes 
(Knill et al. 2010; 2012).
Policy items refer to the specific policy targets addressed in a 
certain policy field and thus focus on the question who or what 
is exactly regulated. In the two policy subfields under scrutiny, 
these items may range from for instance “nitrogen oxide emis-
sions from large combustion plants using coal” to “zinc emis-
sions from industrial discharges into continental surface wa-
ter”.
Policy instruments are an indicator of which specific tools, 
out of range of options, are used by policy-makers in order to 
achieve their targets. A specific policy item is often addressed 
by the use of various instruments. In broad terms, we can dis-
tinguish between traditional “command and control” instru-
ments (Government) and modern market-based, information-
based and cooperative approaches (Governance) (Knill/Lehm-
kuhl 2002; Holzinger et al. 2006).
The regulatory level refers to the exact calibration of the pol-
icy instrument. For instance, in case of an obligatory emission 
standard, the level prescribes the maximum admissible volume 
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of a certain pollutant from passenger cars. In case of state sub-
sidies, it refers to the exact amount of funding. The regulatory 
scope covers the very specific cases or addressees targeted by a 
certain policy instrument.
Using this basic distinction we can compare policies over 
time with their previous regulatory states in light of the intro-
duction or abolishment of policy items and policy instruments 
and the strengthening or weakening of their regulatory level 
or scope.
As a result of the hierarchical structure of the dimensions, 
policy decisions can be weighted differently by a simple logic 
of aggregation. By definition changes in policy items have to 
involve changes in at least one policy instrument and its cali-
bration. Following the same logic, the expansion or disman-
tling of a policy instrument inevitably leads to changes of the 
instrument’s regulatory level and scope. By contrast, both reg-
ulatory level and scope may change without any implication for 
the other two dimensions. Such a prioritization makes perfect 
sense as we can expect the first-time regulation of a certain pol-
lutant to mark a far stronger deviation from the status quo than 
the additional use or re-calibration of a policy measure. The 
same logic applies to cases in which the regulatory standard is 
reduced. All in all, we are now able to adopt a holistic view on 
regulatory activities and their changes over time by offsetting 
the aggregate of all events of policy expansion and dismantling, 
called net policy change.
EU environmental policy and economic 
trends from 1975 to 2014
The analysis focuses on the development of EU environ-
mental policy between 1975 and 2014. In this context we limit 
ourselves to the policy subfields of clean air and water protec-
tion. Both subfields are economically relevant areas of EU pol-
itics and thus are particularly well-suited to examine the re-
lationship of interest. Our assessment 
relies on a comprehensive data collec-
tion comprising all relevant legal docu-
ments, namely EU Directives and Reg-
ulations adopted by the European Com-
mission, the Council of the European 
Union and the European Parliament. EU 
Decisions are not included in the anal-
ysis since they principally apply to very 
specific addressees such as individual 
firms or member states and thus do not 
have a binding effect for the entirety of 
potential regulatory objects. In order to 
provide a balanced analysis, we refer to a 
predefined list of the most common pol-
lutants and regulatory activities in the 
policy subfields under scrutiny (see Con-
sensus 2009; Knill et al. 2010; 2012). The 
selection is based on extensive informa-
tion provided by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and the Pesticide Action Network (PAN).
Figure 1 presents the development of clean air (dashed line) 
and water protection (lighter blue line) policy at EU level from 
1975 to 2014 on the basis of the measurement concept presented 
above. Here, the annual net changes are accumulated to better 
illustrate the dynamics over time. At first sight, we can observe 
a constant upward trend in environmental policy, which is in-
terrupted only by years of regulatory inactivity. This finding is 
well in line with general assessments of the development of 
EU environmental policy (Knill/Liefferink 2007). It also rejects 
the scenario of a race-to-the-bottom or downward pressures on 
regulatory standards as reaction to increasing global competi-
tion (Drezner 2001). Considering the whole observation period, 
small-scale policy dismantling only occurred in 2001 and 2009, 
when EU policy-makers subsequently exempted old and small 
combustion plants from existing regulation.
The most significant punctuation in policy expansion can be 
observed in 1996. Here, the adoption of the Council Directive 
96/61/EC required the Member States to guarantee the appli-
cation of the most effective and advanced stages of technologi-
cal development when issuing operating permits for industrial 
installations. Thus, this legislation laid down the foundations 
for the use of so-called Best Available Techniques, which have 
become one of the Union’s key instruments in the fight against 
environmental pollution and climate change.
Another important aspect revealed in Figure  1 is the far 
greater dynamism in EU environmental policy after 1999. This 
can be explained by the new institutional conditions established 
by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the Treaty of Amsterdam 
in 1999. Both fostered the integration of environmental policy 
goals as a matter of common EU legislation (Knill/Liefferink 
2013). Comparing the growth patterns of the two policy sub-
fields under scrutiny, we can assert that clean air policy devel-
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Figure 1: EU environmental policy from 1975 to 2014.
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oped rather incrementally whereas the 
regulation of water protection evolved 
in sequences of strong policy expansion. 
This difference can be explained by the 
various sources of air pollution like sta-
tionary sources, automobiles or aviation 
activities that do all require distinct treat-
ment and thus several but less compre-
hensive regulatory acts.
To apprehend the interconnection 
between changing economic conditions 
on the one hand and policy responses 
on the other, Figure 2 depicts both the 
net policy changes per year and the an-
nual growth rate of the EU gross do-
mestic product (GDP) from 1975 to 2014. 
The latter  refers to changes in real GDP 
at constant national prices encompass-
ing all member states in consideration 
of member states’ year of accession (Heston et al. 2012; Euro-
stat 2015).
A closer look at the shapes of the two curves reveals that 
there are no common patterns of change until the late 1990s. 
Yet, this image is altered just after the Treaty of Amsterdam 
has completed the inclusion of environmental protection in the 
key clauses of the European Community Treaty. Between 2000 
and 2010 major policy expansions occurred almost exclusively 
in years of strong economic growth. In turn, EU environmen-
tal policy clearly lost its momentum in the years following the 
last great depression. The period from 2011 to mid-2013 pre-
sents the longest time span of regulatory inactivity since the 
early 1980s. All in all, it seems that economic trends do indeed 
determine the political ambitions in environmental policy. In 
this respect, times of economic hardship impinge on environ-
mental policy by slowing down further improvements. How-
ever, an extensive rollback of established environmental stand-
ards is not observable.
But how can we explain the observed patterns? In fact, it 
seems that policy-makers are simply more willing to improve 
environmental standards and thus to burden the economy dur-
ing benign economic conditions. While this reasoning may eas-
ily account for the positive effect of economic trends on en-
vironmental policy, there are several alternative explanations 
assessing the inverse relationship. A persistent stagnation in 
regulatory activities can be the result of, firstly, an agreement 
between the involved decision-makers to not act, as well as, sec-
ondly, the inability to reach broad consensus. In the specific in-
stitutional setting of the EU, these explanatory approaches are 
also linked to different actors and stages in the policy process. 
While the first explanation refers more to the European Com-
mission and its near-monopoly in initiating policies, the second 
one applies to the later stages of the policy-making process and 
thus to the negotiations in and between the European Parlia-
ment and the Council of the European Union.
Exploring different explanatory  
 approaches
Our interviews with European Commission representatives 
confirmed the notion that the Commission has generally be-
come far more cautious regarding the negative effects of reg-
ulation on economic recovery and job creation. Thus, the eco-
nomic uncertainty in Europe has altered the Commission’s pol-
icy preferences to the disadvantage of environmental ambitions. 
This is best illustrated by the Commission’s renewed commit-
ment to make greater use of economic impact assessments at 
the pre-proposal stage and to withdraw policy proposals pend-
ing in the legislative procedure (European Commission 2010). 
In its 2015 Working Program, the Commission even announces 
a fitness check for central pieces of existing environmental leg-
islation including the regulations on Ecolabel and Eco-Man-
agement and Audit Scheme regulations as well as the Natural 
habitats (Natura 2000) Directive (European Commission 2015).
In addition to this, our interview partners noted that general 
saturation effects and cycles of policy-making might also play 
a role. From this perspective, the sharp drop from thirty pol-
icy proposals adopted by the Commission in 2008 to only six in 
2009 and ten in 2010 can be explained partially by the transition 
from the Barroso I to the Barroso II Commission.
With regard to the second explanatory approach, the inability 
of involved decision-makers to reach broad agreements, the ne-
gotiations prior to the adoption of Regulation (EU) No 333/2014 
may provide some important insights. This legislation is one 
of the very few relevant environmental policies that made it 
through the entire legislative process in the post-crisis period. 
The initial Commission proposal merely aimed at clarifying mi-
nor modalities in order to adjust the existing regulation of CO2 
emissions from new passenger cars to the new EU 2020 targets. 
An emission target of 95 gram CO2 per kilometre was already 
determined in the predecessor Regulation (EC) No 443/20. Yet, 
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Figure 2: Net policy changes and GDP growth rates per year.
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one of these modalities, namely the slope of the target line, 
caused fierce debates and serious political tensions.
Broadly speaking, the target line defines the CO2 targets for 
individual car manufacturers based on the vehicle’s weight. In 
turn, the slope of this target line specifies the burden sharing 
with regard to the admissible CO2 emission between lighter 
and heavier vehicles. The major issue in this connection is that 
the manufactures of heavy cars are concentrated in Germany, 
whereas the European South is home to carmakers manufac-
turing light vehicles such as Fiat in Italy and PSA Peugeot Cit-
roën and Renault in France. This unequal distribution became 
crucial in the years following the crisis as in particular Ital-
ian and French companies suffered from economic difficulties 
while German luxury car manufacturers were able to compen-
sate losses on the European market by exports outside of Europe.
The negative effects of the crisis overshadowed the whole 
negotiation process. German representatives already accused 
an early Commission draft that set less challenging targets for 
small and more challenging for large cars as a “gift to strug-
gling French and Italian carmakers” (European Voice 2013a). 
In turn, the French and Italian Governments kept pushing for 
higher CO2 emission standards at the expense of the German 
car industry. During the two years of negotiations, the German 
Government constantly tried to undermine any compromise by 
demanding more and more political concessions. In June 2013, 
Chancellor Angela Merkel even personally contacted the Irish 
Prime Minister Kenny during the Irish Council Presidency to 
undo a deal that had just been achieved between the European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union. Merkel 
justified the German strategy by claiming that “at a moment 
when we sit together for days to talk about employment, we also 
need to be careful to not weaken our industrial base” (Euro pean 
Voice 2013b). According to environmental groups this strong 
political interference of a single member state’s head of gov-
ernment has been “unprecedented” in the history of EU envi-
ronmental policy-making (The Guardian 2013). The negotia-
tions finally resulted in a minimum compromise in May 2014 
that did reduce the permitted threshold as planned but also al-
lowed for several derogation measures.
The negotiations on Regulation (EU) No 333/2014 reveal es-
pecially two aspects that are relevant for this study. Firstly, it 
shows that, even at the advanced stages of the policy process, 
decisions have become much more conditional on policies’ ex-
pected economic impacts. Secondly, it shows that the crisis trig-
gered more protectionist behaviour on the part of the mem-
ber states. The interplay of these factors decreases the politi-
cal room for manoeuvre and thus reduces the actor’s ability to 
reach broad agreements in the area of environmental policy.
Conclusion
We proposed a new measurement concept that adopts an 
aggregate view on the development of environmental policy 
and allows for systematic cross-sectional and longitudinal com-
parison. The application of this concept enabled us to analyse 
the development of EU environmental policy between 1975 and 
2014 and to contrast the observed patterns with macroeconomic 
data.
We find evidence suggesting an impact of economic trends 
on environment protection measures. This becomes particu-
larly obvious after the outbreak of the crisis when the EU en-
tered a four-year period of almost complete regulatory inactiv-
ity. By exploring different explanatory approaches, we showed 
that it is reasonable to assume that the most recent economic 
crisis impinged heavily on the policy process by, firstly, alter-
ing Commission’s policy preferences to the disadvantage of en-
vironmental ambitions and by, secondly, decreasing the polit-
ical leeway it needs to reach broad consensus during negotia - 
 tions.
Interestingly, the observed patterns reveal a picture of en-
vironmental policy dismantling by non-decision. Rather than 
 explicitly trying to reduce policy requirements defined in exist-
ing legislation, factual dismantling is based on the non-adjust-
ment of the policy status quo to technological progress and new 
environmental problem pressures. This strategy of non-deci-
sion is generally preferred to more explicit approaches by pol-
icy-makers, given its lower political visibility and hence lower 
political costs to legitimize a cutting-back of regulatory stan - 
 dards.
It remains to be seen whether the years 2011 to 2014 just 
marked a temporary deviation from previous patterns or a long 
lasting turning point in the history of EU environmental pol-
icy. Considering the ten priorities of the Juncker Commission, 
it seems unlikely that we will experience a reinvigoration of en-
vironmental policy in the near future. In this context much de-
pends on whether or not the European Parliament and Brus-
sel’s environmental organisations will manage to transcend the 
regulation-deregulation dichotomy by highlighting the poten-
tials of environmental regulation for economic growth.
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